The Honorable Mona Makram-Ebeid delivering her speech at the Japanese National Press Club on Oct 10th

Professor Mona Makram-Ebeid Gives Her Prescription for the Egyptian Future

David Cortez

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David Cortez

October 19, 2017

On Tuesday October 10th at the Japanese National Press Club in Tokyo, former Egyptian parliamentarian and current Professor of Political Science at the American University of Cairo, Mona Makram-Ebeid, was invited to speak on the future of Egypt in the aftermath of its two destabilizing revolutions.

Fully understanding the sheer scope of the topic at hand, Makram-Ebeid opted to have the audience of journalists begin with a round of questions before she delivered her speech. The audience was made up of Japanese reporters from various publications whose questions ranged from inquiry about the economic goals of sitting President el-Sisi to the anti-Islamization sentiment among the Egyptian youth. Makram-Ebeid took all these concerns into account during a speech that painted a picture of an Egypt that had lost its footing as a functional democracy following the 2011 revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup.

Makram-Ebeid needed first to explain how Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first elected president and elected successor to the ousted Hosni Mubarak during the 2011 revolution, is now sitting on death row. She stated that, “People in Egypt don’t want to be ruled by the clerics, they don’t want to be told what to do or when to pray”. This was a clear reference to the steady movement towards Islamization after the election by Morsi, a member of the Islamic Brotherhood.

She made it clear that Morsi’s original popularity plummeted when he and his Muslim Brotherhood party refused to operate through the appropriate democratic channels and instead chose violence to unilaterally force compliance with their Islamist agenda. While Egyptians slowly watching their democratic dreams slip away as Morsi spearhead a slow grind towards theocracy might explain why the people largely supported the 2013 military coup conducted by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, it does not explain why the democratically hopeful Egyptian’s of 2011 voted for Morsi’s Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in the first place.

On July 3rd 2013, the military lead by General el-Sisi removed Mohammed Morsi from power, ushering in the current installment of the Egyptian government. Makram-Ebeid characterized this removal as necessary based on fears that the Muslim Brotherhood was putting Egypt “on the verge of severe civil strife if not civil war and that the country may be headed the way of Syria or Libya”. In this same breath Makram-Ebeid claimed that contrary to the Western narrative of a military coup, Morsi was removed by “popular impeachment”. She said, “It was the same as they did with Nixon. It was the people that demanded the removal of the leader”. In an attempt to bolster this claim, Makram-Ebeid told a story of how she was a part of a government faction that personally petitioned the military to remove Morsi, however this would not be an action that would be recognized as part of the popular impeachment process in the U.S.

Regardless of these seemingly pro-regime explanations regarding el-Sisi’s action in 2013, Makram-Ebeid did acknowledge that “the manner in which Morsi was removed had significant consequences for Egypt’s democratic prospects”. She coherently explained how the alignment of the army, the Muslim Brotherhood, and opposition organizations was a trifecta that was inherently toxic to democracy. “If the two civilian actors had decided to work together to defeat the military,” said Makram-Ebeid, “the Brotherhood would have gained enough power to create a religious dictatorship and set Egypt back hundreds of years”, implying that it was the right move for the civilian government to chose to support the military instead.

Makram-Ebeid is, however, aware that el-Sisi’s governing methods do not resemble those of a healthy democracy. According to Makram-Ebeid, whatever stability el-Sisi has brought, “has come with a harsh cracked down on descent, a decline of freedoms, a decline in human rights, and an increase in abuses by the police and judiciary”. Despite this however, Makram-Ebeid seems to suggest patience as Egypt goes through its growing pains.

The situation in Egypt in 2013 was complex to say the least. The coup that left Egypt with an alliance between the civilian leadership and the army against the brotherhood all but guaranteed a postponement of full democracy and full civilian control for some years. “This may be the fastest possible path towards sustainable democracy if certain requirements are met”, added Makram-Ebeid, as she began to outline what the future may hold given the circumstances.

The requirements Makram-Ebeid speaks of have to do with the appropriate targets that the interim government should focus on as they attempt to create a thriving democracy. The first target is to pay closer attention to demographics. “There is a peril in having millions of undereducated, underemployed young men and women with very little to lose, living very difficult lives amid a lack of basic services,” stated Makram-Ebeid. She went on to invoke that fact that the 2011 revolution was not originally a corrupt election of Islamists, nor a military coup. It was a movement by secular young Egyptians who represent 45 million people under the age of 35, an important demographic in a nation of 95 million. This youth movement “heralded immense promise for the future” asserted Makram-Ebeid, suggesting that the sentiment of the youth in 2011 should be harnessed in order to create the resilient democracy that Egyptians are aiming for.

In addition to calls to empower the youth, Makram-Ebeid advises Egypt to focus on its economic challenges. The optimism surrounding the short-term successes of the el-Sisi government after the removal of Mohammed Morsi must be tempered with a bit of skepticism about its sustainability.

Makram-Ebeid succinctly stated, “The combination of nationalism, modest economic growth, and the highlighting of the war on terror is politically sustainable among a broad section of the population who support el-Sisi’s moves because they have been frustrated by years of uncertainty and economic decline, but unless a more comprehensive set of political and economic reforms are put in place over time, the long-term prospects of stability in Egypt will be in jeopardy”. With rising fuel prices and a rapid devaluation of the currency plaguing Egypt’s consumer buying power, Makram-Ebeid warns that el-Sisi’s short-term bet on new jobs and foreign investment risk another social explosion if they do not provide the economic promise he seems to anticipate.

Ultimately for Makram-Ebeid, focusing on the youth and on the economy will lead Egypt into the stable future that it seeks, and, as she put it, “The stability of Egypt means the stability of the region”.

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